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Abstract 
This paper examines the role of human rights instruments and regional integration instruments as 
well as their potential for overlap when it comes to the protection of foreign investors. As an 
example it analyses the Southern African Development Community (SADC) as well as the use of its 
Tribunal by private parties. As a case study it focuses on the decision by the SADC Tribunal of 28 
November 2008 in the Case Mike Campbell [PVT] Limited and others. v. Zimbabwe.  
This paper analyses first the results in this case and the action taken by the SADC Member States 
with regard to the potential overlap of legal regimes - in particular the protection of property and 
(foreign) investors in the region through human rights instruments and BITs. It compares the role of 
the SADC tribunal in this particular situation to the one of investor-state arbitration by comparing 
the SADC Tribunal decision to the the parallel case of Bernardus Henricus Funnekotter and Others 
v. Republic of Zimbabwe, (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/6) of 22 April 2009 – a traditional investor-
State arbitral award and the attempts by several foreign investors to obtain diplomatic protection 
from their home States. 
The paper concludes that the SADC tribunal has the potential to strengthen the rule of law and and 
the protection of property rights in the region. It thereby could contribute to an improvement of the 
legal environment. The paper concludes that the parallel availability of human rights mechanisms 
and BITs in this context would be comparable to the situation currently found in Europe with regard 
to the ECHR and BITs. The intention of the analysis provided for in paper is to be not only useful 
for the SADC framework, but also for problems of overlap and legal shortcomings in other regional 
fora, be it NAFTA, the EU, MERCOSUR, ASEAN or the ANDEAN Community and in the 
increasing number of bilateral free trade (and investment) agreements currently under negotiation.  
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Introduction 
Starting in 2000, the Government of Zimbabwe has expropriated a number of land-owners. It was 
usually held that this was only due to the fact that they were white and thus did not fit into the 
current policy of the Government to favour black ownership of agricultural land.1 In March 2008, in 
a consolidated case (Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd and others. v. Zimbabwe), 79 applicants challenged 
the legality of these measures before the Southern African Development Community Tribunal 
(hereinafter: SADC Tribunal): they considered the compulsory acquisition by the Zimbabwean 
Government an unlawful expropriation that was not in conformity with the legal standards provided 
for under the Treaty establishing the Southern African Development Community (hereinafter: 
SADC). On 28 November 2008, the Tribunal held that the acquisition of the agricultural lands by 
the Zimbabwean government were illegal as they were discriminating (based on race) and were not 
accompanied by adequate compensation.2
Legal Foundations of the Measures 
The new policy regarding the so-called “compulsory acquisition” of agricultural land was originally 
based on Amendment 16 of the Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe, adopted by Parliament 
on 19 April 2000.3 This original legal basis was completed by another amendment (Amendment 17) 
on 14 September 2005. Both texts authorized the taking of white-owned farmlands without 
compensation.4
In particular following, the insertion of Section 3 of Amendment No. 16, the relevant part of the 
Constitution read as follows: 
16A Agricultural land acquired for resettlement  
 
                                                 
1 See Memory Dube, Land reform in Zimbabwe - context, process, legal and constitutional issues and implications for 
the SADC region, in: Monitoring regional integration in Southern Africa, vol. 8, 2008, 303-341.  
2 See SADC Tribunal, Main Decision of .28 November 2008 in Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd and Others v Republic of 
Zimbabwe (Case no 2 of 2007), page 17 ff: for a detailed analysis of the facts and the legal findings of the SADC 
Tribunal see Dunia Prince Zongwe, The Contribution of Campbell v. Zimbabwe to the Foreign Investment Law on 
Expropriations, Namibia Law Journal, vol. 2, no. 1, 2010 also as CLPE Research Paper no. 50/2009, available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1516564 
3 Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment No. 16, Act 5 of 2000. [hereinafter Amendment 16], available 
atwww.parlzim.gov.zw/cms/.../ZimbabweConstitution.pdf . 
4 Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment No. 17, Act 5 of 2005. [hereinafter Amendment 17], equally available at 
www.parlzim.gov.zw/cms/.../ZimbabweConstitution.pdf. 
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(1) In regard to the compulsory acquisition of agricultural land for the 
resettlement of people in accordance with a programme of land reform, the 
following factors shall be regarded as of ultimate and overriding importance — 
(a) under colonial domination the people of Zimbabwe were unjustifiably 
dispossessed of their land and other resources without compensation; 
(b) the people consequently took up arms in order to regain their land and 
political sovereignty, and this ultimately resulted in the Independence of 
Zimbabwe in 1980;  
(c) the people of Zimbabwe must be enabled to reassert their rights and 
regain ownership of their land;and accordingly—  
(i) the former colonial power has an obligation to pay compensation 
for agricultural land compulsorily acquired for resettlement, through 
an adequate fund established for the purpose; and  
(ii) if the former colonial power fails to pay compensation through 
such a fund, the Government of Zimbabwe has no obligation to pay 
compensation for agricultural land compulsorily acquired for 
resettlement.  
(2) In view of the overriding considerations set out in subsection (1), where 
agricultural land is acquired compulsorily for the resettlement of people in 
accordance with a programme of land reform, the following factors shall be taken 
into account in the assessment of any compensation that may be payable — 
(a) the history of the ownership, use and occupation of the land;  
(b) the price paid for the land when it was last acquired;  
(c) the cost or value of improvements on the land;  
(d) the current use to which the land and any improvements on it are being 
put;  
(e) any investment which the State or the acquiring authority may have made 
which improved or enhanced the value of the land and any improvements on 
it;  
(f) the resources available to the acquiring authority in implementing the 
programme of land reform;  
(g) any financial constraints that necessitate the payment of compensation in 
instalments over a period of time; and  
 (h) any other relevant factor that may be specified in an Act of Parliament.  
 
Furthermore through Section 4 of the Amendment No. 17, Article 23 of the Constitution (Protection 
from discrimination on the grounds of race, etc.) was amended with an additional exception from its 
general application that reads as follows: 
3 
(3) Nothing contained in any law shall be held to be in contravention of subsection 
(1)(a) to the extent that the law in question relates to any of the following matter 
— 
[...]  
(g) the implementation of affirmative action programmes for the protection 
or advancement of persons or classes of persons who have been previously 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination. 
 
In addition, Amendment 17 of 2005 effectively vests the ownership of agricultural lands 
compulsorily acquired under Section 16B (2) (a) (i) and (ii) in Republic of Zimbabwe and ousts the 
jurisdiction of the courts to entertain any challenge concerning such acquisitions.5
The South African Development Community (SADC) 
The Southern African Development Community (hereinafter: SADC) was established in 1992 as a 
successor to the original Southern African Development Coordination Conference (hereinafter: 
SADCC). The latter had been formed in Lusaka, Zambia on April 01, 1980 through the so-called 
Lusaka Declaration (Southern Africa: Towards Economic Liberation).6  
The original members were the so-called “Frontline States” (FLS) a group of countries in Southern 
Africa that tried to overcome its dependency on South Africa and its apartheid regime of the time. 
The goal was first and foremost the political liberation of Southern Africa and the end of apartheid. 
Already in May 1979 consultations had been held between Ministers of Foreign Affairs and 
Ministers responsible for Economic Development from Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, 
Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia in Gaborone, Botswana. Subsequently a 
meeting was held in Arusha, Tanzania in July 1979 which later led to the establishment of SADCC. 
On August 17, 1992, at their Summit held in Windhoek, Namibia, the Heads of State and 
Government of the SADCC States signed the “SADC Treaty and Declaration” that transformed the 
SADCC into the SADC.7 The objective also shifted to promote economic integration following the 
independence of the rest of the Southern African countries. Currently the SADC has 15 members. In 
addition to the original SADCC States they are: the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Malawi, 
Mauritius, Namibia, the Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe. According to the 
SADC web page they have currently a common population of 257.7 Million inhabitants and a Gross 
                                                 
5 See also the findings of the SADC Tribunal, Main Decision of .28 November 2008 in Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd and 
Others v Republic of Zimbabwe (Case no 2 of 2007), at page 12. 
6 For details see Gabriël Oosthuizen, The Southern African Development Community: The organisation, its history, 
policies and prospects. Institute for Global Dialogue: Midrand, South Africa, 2006 and Luís Bernando Nunes Mexia 
Castelo Branco, Das razões políticas da SADCC às razões económicas da SADC, Lisboa (Univ. Lusíada), 1997. 
7 The texts are available at: http://www.sadc.int/index/browse/page/119, 
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Domestic Product (GDP) of 471.1 Billion US$. The headquarters of SADC are located in Gabarone 
(Botswana).8
In order to foster economic integration, in 1996 the SADC Members signed a Protocol aiming at the 
creation of a free trade zone among them. This Protocol only entered into force in 2000. In a 
political decision of 2003 (Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan; RISDP) the members 
agreed in addition to fully implement the the free trade zone by 2008 and to create a customs union 
by 2010 and a common market by 2015. Ultimate goal would be an Economic Union by 2016 and 
the introduction of a common currency by 2018.9
The SADC Tribunal 
The SADC Tribunal, according to Article 9 of the SACD Treaty of 1992, is one of eight common 
institutions.10 It's basic role and purpose can be found in Article 16 of the SADC Treaty11: 
ARTICLE 16 THE TRIBUNAL 
 
1. The Tribunal shall be constituted to ensure adherence to and the proper interpretation 
of the provisions of this Treaty and subsidiary instruments and to adjudicate upon such 
disputes as may be referred to it. 
2. The composition, powers, functions, procedures and other related matters governing 
the Tribunal shall be prescribed in a Protocol adopted by the Summit. 
3. Members of the Tribunal shall be appointed for a specified period. 
4. The Tribunal shall give advisory opinions on such matters as the Summit or the 
Council may refer to it. 
5. The decisions of the Tribunal shall be final and binding. 
 
                                                 
8 The document is available at http://www.sadc.int/fta. 
9 Text available at: http://www.sadc.int/index/browse/page/104 
10 Namely, the Summit of Heads of State & Government, SADC Tribunal, Council of Ministers, Organ on Politics, 
Defence and Security Cooperation, Sectoral/Cluster Ministerial Committees, SADC Secretariat, Standing 
Committee of Senior Officials, and SADC National Committees. See also Oliver C. Ruppel and Francois X. 
Bangamwabo, The SADC Tribunal: A Legal Analysis of its Mandate and Role in Regional Integration, in: 
Monitoring Regional Integration in  Southern Africa Yearbook 2008 (Namibian Economic Policy Research Unit 
2008, 7. 
11 There exist other more specific dispute settlement provision, e.g. regarding trade within SADC under the Southern 
African Development Community Protocol on Trade, Annex VI, at 
http://www.sadc.int/documents/trade/annex6.doc; see Joost Pauwelyn, Going Global or Regional or Both? Dispute 
Settlement in the South African Development Community (SADC) and Overlaps with Other Jurisdictions, in 
particular that of the WTO, Minnesota Journal of Global Trade, vol. 1, 2004; available online at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=478041.  
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The details regarding the functions and the organization of the Tribunal are laid down in the 
Protocol on Tribunal in the Southern African Development Community. In line with Article 4 (4) of 
the Protocol, the first members of this permanent Court were appointed by the Summit of Heads of 
State or Government, the Supreme Policy Institution of SADC, during its Summit of Heads of State 
or Government held in Gaborone, Botswana on 18th August 2005. The inauguration of the Tribunal 
and the swearing in of the Members took place on 18th November 2005 in Windhoek, Namibia.  
The Role of the SADC Tribunal in Case 2/2007 
The Case Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd and Others v Republic of Zimbabwe (Case no 2 of 2007) was 
the second case registered with the Tribunal.12  
The access by natural persons to the Court – apart from staff cases – is governed by Articles 14 and 
15 of the Protocol: 
 
ARTICLE 14 BASIS OF JURISDICTION 
 
The Tribunal shall have jurisdiction over all disputes and all applications referred to it in 
accordance with the Treaty and this Protocol which relate to: 
(a) the interpretation and application of the Treaty; 
(b) the interpretation, application or validity of the Protocols, all subsidiary instruments 
adopted within the framework of the Community, and acts of the institutions of the 
Community; 
(c) all matters specifically provided for in any other agreements that States may 
conclude among themselves or within the community and which confer jurisdiction on 
the Tribunal. 
 
ARTICLE 15 SCOPE OF JURISDICTION 
 
1. The Tribunal shall have jurisdiction over disputes between States, and between 
natural or legal persons and States. 
2. No natural or legal person shall bring an action against a State unless he or she has 
exhausted all available remedies or is unable to proceed under the domestic jurisdiction. 
3. Where a dispute is referred to the Tribunal by any party the consent of other parties to 
the dispute shall not be required. 
 
It should be noted that the claimants had also launched proceedings in the domestic court system of 
Zimbabwe - but ultimately lost their case before the Zimbabwean Supreme Court. The Court came 
                                                 
12 All cases and related documents are available on the home page of the Tribunal at: http://www.sadc-
tribunal.org/pages/decisions.htm. 
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to the conclusion that the compulsory acquisition of the farmland in Zimbabwe did not constitute 
“racial discrimination” as the text of the applicable law made no reference to race or colour. 
Furthermore, the domestic law was considered a sufficient legal basis for the taking of the property 
without compensation. 13
Investor Protection by the SADC Tribunal ? 
 
Already before the decision by the South African Supreme Court was handed down (22 January 
2008), the claimant had filed on 11 October 2007 a complaint with the SADC Tribunal (in Case 
Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd and Others v Republic of Zimbabwe (Case no 2 of 2007), simultaneously 
asking for interim measures to protect him and his property. The SADC Tribunal granted the interim 
measures in a rather summary decision on 13 December 2007 based on the finding that the 
claimants had prima facie a case and postponed the decision on the admissibility for the main 
proceedings.14
The most surprising part of the Campbell Case was the fact that the claimants managed to find a 
substantive guarantee available to them under the SADC Treaty to be protected by the SADC 
Tribunal. The substantive provisions invoked by the claimants were found in Article 4 of the Treaty, 
which reads: 
 
ARTICLE 4 PRINCIPLES 
 
SADC and its Member States shall act in accordance with the following principles: 
a. sovereign equality of all Member States;  
b. solidarity, peace and security;  
c. human rights, democracy and the rule of law;  
d. equity, balance and mutual benefit; and  
e. peaceful settlement of disputes.  
 
Although this Article seems rather general and speaks only of principles, the SADC Tribunal 
interpreted it as meaning that: 
“SADC as a collectivity and as individual member States are under a legal obligation to 
respect and protect human rights of SADC citizens. They also have to ensure that there 
is democracy and the rule of law within the region. The matter before the Tribunal 
                                                 
13 Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd. and Another v Minister of National Security Responsible for 
Land, Land Reform and Resettlement (124/06) [2008] ZWSC 1 (22 January 2008); decision made available by the 
Southern African Legal Information Institute at: http://www.saflii.org/zw/cases/ZWSC/2008/1.html. 
14 See SADC Tribunal, Interim Ruling of 13 December 2007 in Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd and Others v Republic of 
Zimbabwe (Case no 2 of 2007). 
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involves an agricultural land, which the applicants allege that it has been acquired and 
that their property rights over that piece of land have thereby been infringed. This is a 
matter that requires interpretation and application of the Treaty thus conferring 
jurisdiction on the Tribunal.”15
 
 
In its final decision16 the Tribunal also referred to Article 6 of the Treaty which requires: 
ARTICLE 6 GENERAL UNDERTAKINGS 
 
1. Member States undertake to adopt adequate measures to promote the 
achievement of the objectives of SADC, and shall refrain from taking any 
measure likely to jeopardise the sustenance of its principles, the achievement of 
its objectives and the implementation of the provisions of this Treaty.  
2. SADC and Member States shall not discriminate against any person on grounds 
of gender, religion, political views, race, ethnic origin, culture, ill health, 
disability, or such other ground as may be determined by the Summit. [...]   
Thereby the Tribunal interpreted Article 4 as importing the right to property into the SADC Treaty 
as they considered the later a natural element of “human rights, democracy and the rule of law” as 
referred to in Article 4 of the SADC Treaty. Thereby the SADC Tribunal adopted the role of a 
human rights court – a role that does not appear in such clarity under the SADC Treaty and even the 
Protocol establishing the Tribunal, maybe with the exception of the prohibition to discriminate 
contained in Article 6(2) of the SADC Treaty.17 This human rights dimension is increased by the 
                                                 
15 SADC Tribunal, Interim Ruling of 13 December 2007 in Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd and Others v Republic of 
Zimbabwe (Case no 2 of 2007), page 3. 
16 See SADC Tribunal, Main Decision of 28 November 2008 in Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd and Others v Republic of 
Zimbabwe (Case no 2 of 2007), page 26. 
17 See, however, Admark Moyo, Defending human rights and the rule of law by the SADC Tribunal, African human 
rights law journal, vol. 9, no. 2, 2009, 590-614 and Oliver Christian Ruppel, The SADC Tribunal, regional 
integration and human rights, Recht in Afrika, vol. 12, no.2., 2009, 213-238. 
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important references to the Statutes18 and Decisions19 by other regional human rights courts in the 
final judgement in Case 2/2007.20
This interpretation was of course not undisputed, Zimbabwe had in its pleadings argued that the 
SADC Treaty “only sets out the principles and objectives of SADC. It does not set out the standards 
against which actions of Member States can be assessed.” Furthermore Zimbabwe contended that 
the Tribunal “cannot borrow these standards from other Treaties as this would amount to legislating 
on behalf of SADC Member States.” As there is no implementing Protocol with regard to Article 4 
of the SADC Treaty, Zimbabwe regarded the statement of the SADC Tribunal that it had 
jurisdiction to hear an case that involved the violation of human rights as ultra vires.21
The Tribunal held according to Article 21 (b) of the “Protocol of the Tribunal and the Rules of 
Procedure thereof” that it was enjoined to develop its own jurisprudence and also to do so “having 
regard to applicable treaties, general principles and rules of public international law”, According to 
the Tribunal this “settles the question whether the Tribunal can look elsewhere to find answers 
where it appears that the Treaty is silent.”22
The Tribunal held it to be “settled law” that the rule of law – as contained in Article 4 of the SADC 
Treaty – should be read as including the “at least two fundamental rights, namely, the right of access 
to the courts and the right to a fair hearing before an individual is deprived of a right, interest or 
legitimate expectation.”23  
The Tribunal came to the conclusion that the applicants ”had been deprived of their agricultural 
lands without having had the right of access to the courts and the right to a fair hearing, which are 
                                                 
18 With regard to the obligation to exhaust local remedies as mentioned in Article 14 of the Protocol relating to the 
SADC Tribunal, refers to Article 26 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 50 of the African 
Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights. See SADC Tribunal, Main Decision of .28 November 2008 in Mike 
Campbell (Pvt) Ltd and Others v Republic of Zimbabwe (Case no 2 of 2007), page 17 ff.. 
19 Among others, the Tribunal referred to the ECHR cases of Golder v UK (1975) and Philis v. Greece (1991) and the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights' Advisory Opinion OC-9/87 of 6 October 1987 at page 28 ff. 
20 Regarding the choice of a “human rights approach” as opposed to an “investment approach” see also Dunia Prince 
Zongwe, The Contribution of Campbell v. Zimbabwe to the Foreign Investment Law on Expropriations, Namibia 
Law Journal, vol. 2, no. 1, 2010; also published as CLPE Research Paper no. 50/2009, available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1516564, p. 4 as well as Lonius Ndlovu,  Following the NAFTA Star - SADC land reform 
and investment protection after the Campbell litigation, Law, Democracy and Development (Journal of the Faculty 
of Law at the University of the Western Cape), vol. 15, 2011, available online at: 
http://www.ldd.org.za/images/stories/Ready_for_publication/nafta.pdf.  
21 See SADC Tribunal, Main Decision of 28 October 2008 in Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd and Others v Republic of 
Zimbabwe (Case no 2 of 2007), page 23 ff. 
22 Id., page 25. 
23 Id.,  page 26. 
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essential elements of the rule of law, and that accordingly Article 4 (c) of the SADC Treaty had 
been breached”.24
Similarly the Tribunal came to the conclusion that racial discrimination was “outlawed” by 
international law as well as Art. 6 (2) of the SADC Treaty. The Tribunal referred, inter alia to Art. 
1(3) of the UN Charter, Article 2 of the UN Declaration of Human Rights ,Article 2 (1) of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 2 (2) of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the he Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination. The Tribunal held that is was of particular importance that Zimbabwe had 
acceded to both Covenants, the African Charter and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination. 25 In order to define “racial discrimination”, the Tribunal again made 
abundant use of decisions and recommendations of international bodies under various treaty 
regimes. Ultimately, the Tribunal held that the measures by Zimbabwe constitute de fact 
discrimination against white farmers based on race in violation of Article 6 (2) SADC Treaty 
although the the Constitutional amendments did not openly refer to white farmer as main target 
group.26  
A particularly interesting statement can be found at page 53 of the decision: 
 
“We wish to observe here that if: (a) the criteria adopted by the Respondent in relation 
to the land reform programme had not been arbitrary but reasonable and objective; (b) 
fair compensation was paid in respect of the expropriated lands, and (c) the lands 
expropriated were indeed distributed to poor, landless and other disadvantaged and 
marginalized individuals or groups, rendering the purpose of the programme legitimate, 
the differential treatment afforded to the Applicants would not constitute racial 
discrimination.” 
 
With regard to the duty to pay compensation in case of expropriation, the Tribunal held that this 
duty was undisputed by the Parties as being part of (the applicable) international law. The Tribunal 
therefore concluded that “fair compensation is due and payable to the Applicants by the Respondent 
in respect of their expropriated lands.” Furthermore Zimbabwe was directed to take all necessary 
measures, to protect the possession, occupation and ownership of the lands of the Applicants, and to 
pay fair compensation, on or before 30 June 2009, to the applicants.27  
                                                 
24 Id., Page 41. 
25 Id.,  Page 47. 
26 Id., Page 52 f. 
27 Id., Page 56. 
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Problems regarding the Enforcement of SADC Tribunal Decisions within SADC 
While the SADC judgement in Campbell came to many as a surprise28 and was welcomed as a 
landmark case and therefore a major stepping-stone in improving the “Rule of Law” and the 
economic environment in Southern Africa29, the decisions seems to have overburdened the 
system.30
Already on 30 June 2008 the original applicants filed another claim with the SADC Tribunal 
seeking in substance, a declaration to the effect that Zimbabwe was in breach and contempt of the 
orders of the Tribunal in its decision in Case 2/2007 of 13 December. The Tribunal came to the 
conclusion that, indeed Zimbabwe had not honoured its obligation to refrain from further 
compulsory acquisition of the plaintiffs' property.31 As foreseen by the Article 32 (5) of the Protocol 
on Tribunal in the Southern African Development Community, the Tribunal reported its finding to 
the Summit – SADC's highest organ.32
The Summit of SADC (composed of heads of state and government of the Member States) decided 
on on 17 August 2010 "that a review of the role functions and terms [sic] of reference of the SADC 
Tribunal should be undertaken and concluded within 6 months."33 According to an opinion 
submitted by a group of legal and human rights organizations, the SADC Summit effectively 
suspended the Tribunal, as it failed to renew the tenure of five judges and failed to appoint new 
ones, leaving the Tribunal improperly constituted in violation of the Tribunal's Protocol.34 It was 
generally considered that this was a political reaction to Zimbabwe's challenge to the legality of the 
                                                 
28 See for  example the press coverage in http://www.newzimbabwe.com/pages/farm75.19086.html. 
29 See Oliver Christian Ruppel, The Southern African Development Community (SADC) and its Tribunal - Reflexions 
on a Regional Economic Communities potential impact on human rights protection, in: Verfassung und Recht in 
Übersee, vol. 42 no. 2, 2009, 173-186  
30 See Anna van der Vleuten, Explaining the enforcement of democracy by regional organizations -  Comparing EU, 
Mercosur and SADC, Journal of common market studies, vol. 48, no. 3, 2010, 737-758. 
31 SADC Tribunal, Case No. 11/08 Mike Campbell (PVT) Limited and others v. The Republic Of Zimbabwe. 
32 See also M. C. C. Mkandawire, The SADC Tribunal perspective on enforcement of judgments, Commonwealth law 
bulletin, vol. 36, no. 3, 2010, 567-573. 
33 See Communiqué of the 30th Jubilee Summit of SADC Heads of State and Government of 18 October 2010., 
available at:http://www.info.gov.za/speech/DynamicAction?pageid=461&sid=12314&tid=15559. 
34 In addition, new proceedings (including certain of them relating to Zimbabwe's land policy) were effectively 
prevented from going forwards, see Solomon T. Ebobrah,, Is the SADC Tribunal under judicial siege in Zimbabwe?- 
Reflections on Etheredge v. Minister of State for National Security Responsible for Lands, Land Reform and 
Resettlement and Another, in: The comparative and international law journal of Southern Africa, vol. 43, no. a, 
2010, 81-92. 
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Tribunal after the decision in the Campbell Case.35 In a joint statement the International 
Commission of Jurists (ICJ) and the Southern African Development Community Lawyers 
Association (SADC LA) Africa Programme have expressed their “Concern at the Review of the 
SADC Tribunal as the Subregional Court of Justice.”36 During their summit on 20 May 2011 the 
Heads of State and Government of the SADC members, however, have extended the suspension of 
the Tribunal's activity for 12 months in order to further study the issue. 
In the meantime SADC seems to have commissioned a report with regard to the functioning of the 
Tribunal; a draft of the report entitled “Review of the Role, Responsibilities and Terms of Reference 
of the SADC Tribunal”, written by Lorand Bartels in his role as a Consultant with WTI Advisors, 
seems to have been released on 14 February 2011. According to undocumented information 
disseminated on the internet37, it seems to recommended, among other things, the following:  
Ó SADC Member States should ensure that they give the force of law to SADC law by 
amending national law;  
Ó Member States should consider amending the SADC Treaty to state that SADC law is 
supreme over national law, including constitutional law;  
Ó the Tribunal should be given power to determine its own Rules of Procedure;  
Ó the Tribunal's Protocol should be amended to provide that membership and rights of 
Member States may be suspended, with the Summit taking account of the possible 
consequences of suspension; and 
Ó the Tribunal should be able to order remedies (including fines) for non-compliance.  
Such recommendations remind, obviously of the factors that have made the European Court of 
Justice so successful in the the framework of economic integration in Europe.38
 
                                                 
35 See the analysis by the South African Litigation Centre, published under the title “SALC in the News: SADC 
Tribunal in limbo” on 11 November 2011 on its home page at 
http://www.southernafricalitigationcentre.org/news/2010/11/521 
36 See joint statement at: http://www.icj.org/dwn/database/Statement-SADCreview-19052011.pdf 
37 See Luke Eric Peterson, Fate of international tribunal to be debated by Southern African heads of state; Jurisdiction 
over investment and human rights disputes at issue, Investment Arbitration Reporter of 13 May 2011 as well as Luke 
Eric Peterson, Analysis: Consultant’s draft report on SADC tribunal contains much of interest for international 
disputes specialists, Investment Arbitration Reporter of 13 May 2011. 
38 See, for example, Miguel Poiares Maduro, We the Court, Oxford, Hart, 1998. See also Anna van der Vleuten,   
Explaining the enforcement of democracy by regional organizations - Comparing EU, Mercosur and SADC,  Journal 
of common market studies, vol. 48, no.3, 2010, 737-758. 
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Lack of Enforcement by Domestic Tribunals 
While the SADC Summit's inactivity regarding the enforcement of the decisions by the Tribunals 
led to the suspension and review of the functions of the Tribunal, domestic courts were equally 
unwilling to enforce the decision in the Campbell Case in view of the political and legal challenges. 
It came certainly at no surprise that the courts in Zimbabwe rejected the request to enforce the 
SADC Tribunal decision in the Campbell Case. As a matter of fact in a Decision of .26 January 
2010 the High Court of Zimbabwe declined the application to register the SADC decision for 
purposes of enforcement.39 Judge Patel of the High Court held in this decision that although the 
SADC Tribunal had been properly constituted and had jurisdiction to hear Campbell's case40, its 
decision could not be registered as it was contrary to public policy (ordre public).41 According to 
this High Court Decision, the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe had confirmed the constitutionality of 
the land reform program, and registering the SADC Tribunal's judgement in Zimbabwe would 
undermine the Supreme Court's authority: Furthermore, as the SADC Tribunal decision was in 
contradiction to the Constitution as in force (Section 16B of the Constitution as introduced by 
Amendment 17 in 2005)42 the Court felt bound by the Constitution as supreme law of the land.43
Overlap with the Investment Law Approach 
It is obvious from the language used by the SADC Tribunal that in the area of expropriation the 
procedural rights and the right to property is closely intertwined with the notion of investment and 
the concepts found in bilateral investment treaties (BITs). This is not new, as the very origin of BITs 
can be trace back to the better protection of “property rights of foreigners”44 Equally the refusal by 
                                                 
39 High Court of Zimbabwe (PATEL J), Gramara (PRIVATE) Limited and Colin Bailie Cloete v. Government of the 
Republic of Zimbabwe and Attorney-General of Zimbabwe and Norman Kapanga (Intervener), Opposed 
Application, Harare, 24 November 2009 and 26 January 2010, available at: 
http://www.kubatana.net/docs/landr/high_court_patel_gramara_goz_100126.pdf  
40 The decisions holds: “[S]uch enforcement is governed by the rules of civil procedure for the registration and 
enforcement of foreign judgments.” 
41 It seems that in his report, Lorand Bartels seems to suggest that one could interpret the SADC Treaty and the 
Protocol on Tribunals as obliging Members to comply with SADC law and SADC tribunal decisions just as it is the 
case under the ICSDI Convention or the Treaty on European Union; see Luke Eric Peterson, Analysis: Consultant’s 
draft report on SADC tribunal contains much of interest for international disputes specialists, Investment Arbitration 
Reporter of 13 May 2011. 
42  See above. 
43 See on enforcement of judgements within SADC in general, i.e. not with respect to SADC Tribunal judgements:  
André E. A. M. Thomashausen, The enforcement and recognition of judgments and other forms of legal cooperation 
in the SADC, The comparative and international law journal of Southern Africa, vol. 35, no.1, 2002, 26-37. 
44 See on the reasons for the conclusion of the first modern BIT between Pakistan and Germany Andreas R. Ziegler, 
Multilateraler Investitionsschutz im Wirtschaftsrecht (Multilateral Investment Protection and International 
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the Courts of Zimbabwe to register the judgement of the SADC Tribunal reminds of the eternal 
discussion regarding the enforcement of awards and judgement in investment cases. 
It is however particularly interesting in view of the fact that SADC has the intention to promote and 
protect investments within the region.45 However, the respective treaty has not yet entered into 
force.46 In this context, the use of the SADC tribunal of the “Rule of law” and human rights is 
particularly noteworthy.47 It is therefore certainly interesting to compare the outcome of the 
Campbell Case to the traditional means of protection of foreign investors. As a matter of fact, 
several foreign individuals concerned by Zimbabwe's measures have taken action: 
Ó First, not surprisingly several cases have been reported where foreign owners of land in 
Zimbabwe asked their home States for diplomatic protection.48 In certain cases this seems to 
have led to discussion between Zimbabwe and the Governments concerned, In other cases 
Governments seem to have rejected such claims for foreign policy reasons. The most 
famous case in this respect is probably the inactivity by the South African Government to 
grant diplomatic protection to … as it led to a decision by the South African Supreme Court 
condemning this inactivity.49 In two judgements the Court held that “the failure of the 
[South African Government] to rationally, appropriately and in good faith consider , decide 
and deal with the applicant's application for diplomatic protection in respect of the violation 
of hi s rights by the Government of . Zimbabwe is inconsistent with the Constitution , 1996 . 
and invalid. [...] It is declared that the applicant has the right to diplomatic protection from 
the respondent s in respect of the violation of his rights by the Government of Zimbabwe.” It 
should be noted, however, that as in most States this only means that the Government cannot 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Economic Law), in: Dirk Ehlers und Hans-Michael Wolffgang (ed.), Rechtsfragen internationaler Investitionen, 
Recht und Wirtschaft, Frankfurt a. M., 2009, 63-80. 
45 See Daniela Zampini, Developing a balanced framework for Foreign Direct Investment in SADC - a decent work 
perspective, in: Monitoring regional integration in Southern Africa, vol. 8, 2008, 94-119.  
46 The Bilateral Agreement for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (BIPPA) was signed  in  
Harare  on  27  November  2009 but  will  only  become  binding after  reciprocal  exchange  of notifications   to  the  
effect  that constitutional  requirements  for  entry  into  force  have been  complied with. The BIPPA therefore has 
not come into force for want of such notifications at this time.  
47 This approach is also used by Lonius Ndlovu, Following the NAFTA Star: SADC land reform and investment 
protection after the Campbell litigation, Law, Democracy & Development (Journal of the Faculty of Law at the 
University of the Western Cape), vol. 15, 2011, online at: http://www.ldd.org.za/images/stories/ 
Ready_for_publication/nafta.pdf. 
48 Besides the South African case reported here, e.g. the German Government has taken up the case of Mr von Pezold 
and others; see http://www.cfuzim.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1229:german-investor-in-
zimbabwe-vows-to-press-case-against-land-seizure&catid=93:the-courts&Itemid=92. 
49 High Court of South Africa, Crawford Lindsay von Abo v. Government of the Republic of South Africa and others  
2009 2 SA 526 (TPD) and Case no. 3106/07 Crawford Lindsay von Abo v. Government of the Republic of South 
Africa and others, Judgement of  5 February 2010. 
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simply ignore requests for diplomatic protection but must provide a reasonable justification 
why it declines to grant such protection -  which will normally be for foreign policy 
reasons.50   
Ó Zimbabwe's measures have also led to investor-State dispute settlement proceedings 
governed by a BIT. While several foreign investors and Governments seem to have analysed 
the availability of such instruments to the facts described, the only published arbitral award 
so far seems to be a decision under the BIT between the Netherlands and Zimbabwe51. 
However, several other cases seem under way.52 
Investor-State Dispute Settlement regarding Zimbabwe's Policy 
In a decision Bernardus Henricus Funnekotter and Others v. Republic of Zimbabwe, (ICSID Case 
No. ARB/05/6) of 22 April 200953 an arbitral tribunal constituted under the Rules of the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)54 came to the conclusion that 
Zimbabwe had violated its obligations under Article 6 (c) of the BIT, namely to provide “just 
compensation” in case of expropriation.55
The claimants in this arbitration were able to use the investor-State dispute settlement procedure 
under the BIT between the Netherlands and Zimbabwe as they were of Dutch nationality. The 
Agreement contains a relatively typical provision on expropriation in so far as it provides: 
[n]either Contracting Party shall subject nationals of the other Contracting Party to any 
measures depriving them, directly or indirectly, of their investments unless the 
following conditions are complied with:  
                                                 
50 See e.g. Andreas R. Ziegler, Introduction au droit international public, Bern 2006, § 567. 
51 Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments Between the Republic of Zimbabwe and 
the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Dec. 11, 1996.  
52 For example the Case under the BIT Germany-Zimbabwe regarding Bernhard von Pezold and others v. Republic of 
Zimbabwe (ICSID Case No. ARB/10/15) and the case under the BIT Switzerland-Zimbabwe Border Timbers Ltd. v. 
Zimbabwe, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/25 as reported on the ICSID home page. 
53 The award has been made available in International Legal Materials, vol. 48, 2009, p. 760. and online at: 
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/. 
54 On ICSID see Kryvoi, Yaraslau, International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) (2010). Kluwer 
Law International, 2010. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1449363 and Christoph Schreuer, et al., The 
ICSID Convention, Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press, 2010.  
55 See also Ben Love, Introductory Note to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes: Funnekotter 
and others v. Republic Of Zimbabwe, International Legal Materials, vol. 48, 2009, p. 760 and Cornelia Glinz, The 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes - Funnekotter and others v. Republic of Zimbabwe, case 
no. Arb/05/6 - a test case for commercial farmers in Zimbabwe or: how ICSID can fill the gap in the protection of 




a) the measures are taken in the public interest and under due process of law;  
b) the measures  are  not  discriminatory  or  contrary  to  any undertaking  which the 
former Contracting Party may have given;  
c) the measures are accompanied by provision of just compensation. Such compensation 
shall represent the genuine value of the investments affected and shall, in order to be 
effective for the claimants, be paid and made transferable, without delay, to the country 
designated by the claimants concerned and in the currency of the country of which the 
claimants are nationals or in any  free  convertible currency accepted by  the claimants.  
The  genuine value  of  the investments shall include, but not exclusively, the net asset 
value thereof as certified by an independent firm of auditors. 
 
As the conditions in the Article were considered to be cumulative, the Arbitral Tribunal was able to 
avoid the slightly more complex question regarding the public purpose and the respect for the due 
process of law under letter (a) as well as the discriminatory character of the land takings in 
Zimbabwe (letter b). 56  
With regard to the payment of compensation Zimbabwe was not able to convince the Arbitral 
Tribunal that if the claimants had asked for it before the responsible domestic authorities it would 
have be3en granted. The actions by the Zimbabwean Government prior to the proceedings as well 
as the language used in the Constitutional amendment did not allow for such a conclusion and the 
BIT did not require claimants to exhaust local remedies.57   
When Zimbabwe tried to invoke the state of necessity58 to justify its actions, the Arbitral Tribunal 
was open to allowing such an argument with reference to customary international law and the case 
law of the International Court of Justice – but ultimately saw not link between the situation in 
Zimbabwe at the time and the refusal to calculate and pay compensation to the concerned farmers.59 
As a consequence the Arbitral Tribunal concluded that Zimbabwe had breached Article 6(c) of the 
BIT between the Netherlands and Zimbabwe as it had not paid the compensation required under this 
article. This violation was considered such as to give a right to damages to be paid by Zimbabwe to 
the investors that had brought the claim. 
Under the ICSID Convention – which was used as the forum for the Funnekotter Case – the final 
award is binding and enforceable, No further actions - as available under the ICSID Convention 
                                                 
56 § 98 of the Award. 
57 § 100 and 101 of the Award. 
58 See on this aspect of the award Robert D. Sloane, On the Use and Abuse of Necessity in the Law of State 
Responsibility, American Journal of International Law, Forthcoming; and Boston Univ. School of Law Working 
Paper No. 11-16, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1797926. 
59 § 106 of the Award. 
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(like annulment proceedings and the like) seem to have been introduced by Zimbabwe. The 
plaintiffs, however, seem to have sought enforcement of their award already in foreign jurisdictions, 
including the United States60, although enforcement may suffer from all the normal difficulties that 
petitioners normally face when trying to enforce arbitral awards against States..  
Different venues – different outcomes    
The comparison of the Campbell Judgement by the SADC Tribunal and the Funnekotter arbitral 
award are interesting for several reason: 
In some respect, they show a lot of common ground when it comes to the lawfulness of an 
expropriation. In both cases the compulsory taking of land was considered against the rule of law. 
Technically, however, the ICSID Arbitral Tribunal spoke only of the absence of proper 
compensation as due under the applicable BIT, while the SADC Tribunal focused on the issues of 
due process of law and discrimination. This is due to the different legal basis for the two 
mechanisms and ultimately judicial economy and the choice by both instances to avoid certain 
questions. 
For the individuals concerned, however, the main difference seems to be at the enforcement stage. 
While the ICSID award must be honoured by any ICSID State, including Zimbabwe itself, under 
the ICSID Convention, as currently ratified by 147 States61, the Courts in Zimbabwe seem to be 
reluctant to enforce SADC Tribunal judgements. While one can argue that the obligation under the 
SADC Convention and the Protocol on the Tribunal are identical or comparable to those under the 
ICSDI Convention, the political context seems to make adherence to such a principle in the region 
difficult at this time. 
Human Rights Instruments v. BITs 
It is, admittedly not the first time, that Government measures relating to expropriation and the 
treatment of property overlap.62 The concepts developed with regard to the right to the right to 
property and the guarantees for (foreign) investors have always had a common foundation and in 
those regions where an effective system for the protection of the right to property at the 
international level exists, this has always been accepted by the respective bodies and in the 
literature. When it comes to arbitrary and discriminatory Government actions, BITs can thus in 
                                                 
60 See New York Southern District Court, Funnekotter et al v. Republic of Zimbabwe, (Foley Square), Case no.: 1:09-
cv-08168-CM, filed on 24 September 2009, referred to at http://www.freecourtdockets.com/docketsummaries/ 
Funnekotter-v-Republic-of-Zimbabwe-1-09-cv-08168-New-York-Southern-Federal-District-Court-Docket-Case-
Summary-83069.htm.  
61 See the updated information in this respect at: http://icsid.worldbank.org.  
62 See in general Theo R. G. van Banning,, The human right to property, Antwerpen, Intersentia,2002. 
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certain cases play an important role although they certainly cannot replace the domestic and 
regional protection of human rights through strong specialized instruments and institutions.63
The most important example in this respect is certainly the case-law of the European Court on 
Human Rights regarding the “Right to Property” as contained in Article 1 of the the (First) Protocol 
of 20 March 1952 to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) of 4 November 195064 
but also in view of  the due process of law regarding “civil rights” under Article 6 ECHR. In this 
respect a certain convergence of the concepts has resulted - although a more detailed analysis seems 
to suggest remarkable differences, e.g. regarding the concept of “property” as opposed to an 
“investment”.65 This seems to be due to the different structures and wording of BITs and human 
rights instruments, which then lead normally to different questions. According to Christoph 
Schreuer and Ursula Kriebaum this may be explained also by the lack of dialogue between two 
legal communities: 
“Perhaps the most important reason for this divergence in legal development is the 
isolation in which the two fields of specialization operate. Notwithstanding evident 
similarities, there is little interaction and cross citation between decision makers and 
scholars in the two fields. This in turn is part of a broader phenomenon of fragmentation 
in international law. Increasing specialization has led to epistemic sub-communities 
with their own specialized terminologies which barely communicate with each other. 
Ideas and concepts from one field of international law are virtually unknown in another. 
Well-tested solutions adopted in one field are absent from another. 
 
Initiatives to bridge the gaps between these areas of specialization are entirely feasible. 
They would have to start with advanced legal education, for instance courses co-taught 
                                                 
63 See Cornelia Glinz, The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes - Funnekotter and others v. 
Republic of Zimbabwe, case no. Arb/05/6 - a test case for commercial farmers in Zimbabwe or: how ICSID can fill 
the gap in the protection of human rights violated by a lawless state like Zimbabwe, in: Verfassung und Recht in 
Übersee, vol. 43, no. 3, 2010, p. 369-380. 
64 The text of the respective Article in the ECHR makes reference to international law and thus to the developments of 
the customary concepts: Article 1”Protection of property” reads: “Every natural or legal person is entitled to the 
peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and 
subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.” See Aida Grgić, 
Zvonimir Mataga, Matija Longar and Ana Vilfan, The right to property under the European  Convention on Human 
Rights -A guide to the implementation  of the European Convention on Human Rights and its protocols, Human 
rights handbooks, no. 10, 2007; Jan-Peter Loof, (ed.),The right to property, Maastricht, Shaker, 2000 and Irmgard 
Marboe, Compensation in International Investment Law and Arbitration, in: Andrea Bjorklund, Ian A. Laird and 
Sergey Ripinsky (eds.), Investment Treaty Law: Current Issues, 2009, 29 at 38. 
65 See e.g. Christoph Schreuer and Ursula Kriebaum, The concept of property in human rights law and international 
investment law., Human rights, democracy and the rule of law, 2007, 743-762 and Alexander J. Belohlavek, ECHR: 
'Investment Protection – Adieu...!' Czech Yearbook of International Law, vol. 1, 2010, 332-340 also available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1723717 
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by specialists in different yet related fields. Other possibilities are seminars for 
practitioners that straddle different fields and go beyond a description by specialists of 
their own areas of specialization. Finally, research projects that bring together the best 
parts of the experience of different fields may help to close the growing abyss between 
different fiefdoms within international law.”66
 
Despite the absence of judicial dialogue, the main concepts are certainly comparable and should not 
be considered as creating a lack of coherence in international law. While the substantive standards 
thus certainly do converge and the respective jurisprudence under the ECHR and BITs may – 
hopefully or potentially - influence each other, the existence of the ECHR has not led to the 
disappearance of investment treaties and related arbitral awards in the European context.67 In 
particular, the advantages associated with arbitration as such and the fact that often local remedies 
need not be exhausted under intra-European BITs may be the main factors to make investor-State 
arbitration popular among foreign investors. 
Conclusion 
The SACD Tribunal as established in 1992 was not originally conceived as a human rights court not 
as a tribunal for investor-State claims. Through its decision rendered in the Case Mike Campbell 
[PVT] Limited And Others v. Zimbabwe of 28 November 2008, however, its has shown the potential 
it has to promote on the one hand side the protection of human rights, democracy and the rule of 
law and at the same time – though the inclusion of of property rights and due process of law into 
these concepts, for investment-related activities. It seems that this development was not fully 
anticipated by all SADC members and the future will show whether they will allow the tribunal to 
play this role. Current proposals regarding the future of this tribunal go even further by giving it a a 
role and instruments that do not only remind of the European Court of Human Rights but even of 
the much more far-reaching role of the Court of Justice in the framework of the European Union. 
These are obviously very ambitious proposals. 
At the same time the use made of the SADC Treaty by the SADC Tribunal could be a major chance 
to enhance the rule of law and human rights protection in the region. At the same time, if the Court 
                                                 
66 Christoph Schreuer and Ursula Kriebaum, The concept of property in human rights law and international investment 
law, in Stephan Breitenmoser et al. (eds.), Liber Amicorum Luzius Wildhaber - Human rights, democracy and the 
rule of law, 2007, 743-762 at 761-2. 
67 See in this respect the equally telling “parallel”  cases regarding the treatment of Yukos, its management and its 
shareholders by Russia in the proceedings before the European Court of Human Rights (Application no. 14902/04 
Oao Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, Decision as to the Admissibility of  29 January 2009), in investor-
State arbitration under the Energy Charter Treaty (Yukos Universal Ltd. [UK – Isle of Man] v. Russian Federation, 
Case registered on 3 February 2005, Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility of  30 November 2009). See  
Chiara Giorgetti, The Yukos Interim Awards on Jurisdiction and Admissibility Confirms Provisional Application of 
Energy Charter Treaty,  ASIL Insights, vol. 14, issue23, 3 August 2010.
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were allowed to protect also business and investors I may be helpful in fostering confidence among 
investors and constitute an interesting alternative to the use of investor-State arbitration. Even  in 
this case – as it can be shown for the European Court of Human Rights -  there remain important 
differences that may make one or the other venue available and a preferred option. But on the 
whole, in an environment where the rule of law and legal protection against arbitrary Government 
measures and  business-hindering practices is still weak the existence of various venues has more 
positive effects than negative effects. Here as in other instances, the threats stemming from forum 
shopping, parallel proceedings and incoherent case-law are small in comparison to the chance to 
create an environment in which the “rule of law”and the adjudication of disputes become more 
common and thereby also help to shape a culture of human rights and due process of law.  
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